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Whether children share in anticipation of future benefits returned by a partner is an
interesting question. In this study, 5-year-old children and an adult partner played
a sharing game, in which children donated first and the partner donated afterward.
In Experiment 1, the partner’s resources were more attractive than the child’s. In
the reciprocal condition, the child was told that s/he would be a recipient when the
partner played as a donor. In the non-reciprocal condition, however, the child was told
that an anonymous child would be the recipient when the partner donated. Results
showed that children shared more with the partner when they knew that they would
be a recipient later. In Experiment 2, the child was always the recipient when the
partner donated, but the partner’s resources were more desirable than the child’s in
the high-value condition, and less desirable in the low-value condition. We found that
children were more generous when the partner’s resources were valued higher. These
findings demonstrate that 5-year-old preschoolers’ sharing choices take into account
the anticipated reciprocity of the recipient, suggesting either self-interested tactical
sharing or direct reciprocity in advance of receiving. Specifically, they adjust their sharing
behavior depending on whether a partner has the potential to reciprocate, and whether
it is worth sharing relative to the value of the payback.
Keywords: prosociality, strategic behavior, preschooler, direct reciprocity, self-interest
INTRODUCTION
Prosocial behavior is widespread in human society (Melis and Semmann, 2010), and has roots
early in development, with studies indicating that even toddlers desire to help others or share
resources with others (Warneken and Tomasello, 2006; Warneken et al., 2007; Wu and Su, 2014).
Apparently, the outcome of prosocial behavior is producing or maintaining the well-being of others
(Brief and Motowidlo, 1986). However, the underlying motivations are varied (Leimgruber et al.,
2012). Some prosocial behaviors are altruistic, aiming to increase other’s welfare (Warneken and
Tomasello, 2007; Hepach et al., 2013); whereas, other prosocial behaviors are “strategic”, using
them as a means to achieve another goal, such as benefiting oneself in the long run (Güroǧlu et al.,
2009; Steinbeis et al., 2012; Martin and Olson, 2015). This latter kind of prosocial performance
is a general ingredient of prosociality in daily life. It has been documented widely in adult
studies; however, less is known about how young children perform prosocial behaviors strategically.
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There are robust findings that adults strategically perform
prosocial behavior out of selfish motivation. For example, they
manage their reputation by behaving generously in front of
observers (Milinski et al., 2002; Van Vugt and Hardy, 2010;
Kanazawa and Fontaine, 2013), because a good reputation can
provide priority for future cooperation with others (Nowak and
Sigmund, 2005). In addition, adults share more to elicit direct
reciprocity, a form of interaction in which individuals do the
same thing toward their partner as what their partner did to them
(Wilkowski and Chai, 2012). That is, adults are more generous
toward a potential direct reciprocator in order to get payback
from him/her subsequently (Cox, 2004; Stanca et al., 2009; Kamas
and Preston, 2012).
Similar results have been shown in primary school children.
A recent study found that 10- and 11-year-old children
spontaneously cooperated when there was a high possibility
for future interaction (Blake et al., 2015b). This study adopted
a paradigm of Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD), in which a child
and an anonymous partner decided simultaneously whether to
cooperate or to defect. Individuals would maximize their overall
payoff if both players cooperated; whereas, individuals would get
a higher individual payment if they defected from a cooperative
partner. Results showed that, compared with playing with a
different partner in every round, children cooperated more if
they played with the same partner repeatedly. Therefore, this
suggests that 10- to 11-year-old children strategically cooperate
when future direct reciprocity is more likely.
Can younger children perform strategic prosocial behavior
as well? Some studies on audience effects have provided a
positive answer to this question. For example, one study showed
that 6-year-old children seemed to have a sense of reputation,
pretending to be fair toward others in certain situations (Shaw
et al., 2014). In their study, an experimenter either allocated
four erasers equally between a participant and a non-present
partner (a fair condition), or gave one eraser to the child but two
erasers to the partner (an unfair condition). The experimenter
then left and came back with an additional eraser, asking whether
she should give the eraser to the participant or throw it away.
In the unfair condition, however, the participant got another
eraser from a second experimenter in private when the first
experimenter was outside. Results showed that most 6-year-
old children chose to throw away the additional eraser in the
fair condition, so that each child remained with two erasers.
However, when the first experimenter did not know the existence
of that secret eraser from the second experimenter, fewer children
chose to throw the additional eraser away because it appeared
fair to the first experimenter (Shaw et al., 2014). The audience
effects even emerge in 5-year-old children, who behave more
generously when others are aware of their action (Leimgruber
et al., 2012), especially when the observer has an opportunity
to share resources with them later (Engelmann et al., 2013).
Moreover, a recent study suggested that the audience effects
in preschoolers was driven by a concern for direct responses
from real partners, rather than a mere sense of being monitored
(Fujii et al., 2015). In this study, 5-year-old children shared more
when their behavior was monitored by a real person than by
flowers shown on a computer; however, being monitored by
staring eyes on the computer did not increase children’s sharing
compared to being monitored by a picture of flowers. These
above studies showed that children could share strategically to
actively impress a third party, who might help them gain in the
future or who might give them direct punishments or reward;
however, less is known about children’s strategic behavior to
impress a potential direct reciprocator, who has a chance to
reciprocate the previously received benefits. Because a face-to-
face interaction is very common in daily life, it is important to
explore strategic prosocial behavior during social interactions.
Therefore, the aim of the present study is to explore whether
preschoolers can perform prosocial behavior strategically in
anticipation of payback from a partner with whom they directly
interact.
Two recent studies have provided some evidence for children’s
strategic prosocial behavior during a face-to-face interaction.
Kuhlmeier et al. (2014) proposed that preschoolers might be
able to choose a partner based on whether the partner was
able to repay their initial prosocial actions. This view was
recently supported by Kenward et al.’s (2015) research utilizing
a three-player sharing game, in which children and two other
players could exchange tokens for candies in turn. Participants
exchanged for candies first and they always got two candies.
Then, participants were asked to choose between a rich partner
and a poor partner with whom to share candies. The rich
partner had many tokens, thus could exchange for many candies
later. By contrast, the poor one had no tokens, thus had
no opportunity to get candies. Although, both partners stated
that they would share with the one who shared with them
before if they get candies, only the rich partner was clearly
able to reciprocate during the test. Results showed that 4-year-
old children were more likely to share with the rich partner
(Kenward et al., 2015). This study demonstrated that children
strategically chose a partner who had the capacity to return
favors. In this study, however, participants were forced to choose
one person to share with and the reciprocity norm was explicitly
verbalized. Such a design could not provide information about
whether children would share when giving was optional. In
addition, explicit emphasis of the reciprocity norm might have
promoted children’s strategic sharing. Therefore, it remains an
open question whether children share based on their initiative
in anticipation of reciprocity, when ostensive cues from the
environment are absent.
A similar study conducted by Sebastián-Enesco and
Warneken (2015) could partly answer this question. In this
study, they explored sharing behavior in 3- and 5-year-old
children when a puppet partner was either able or unable to
reciprocate. In an experimental condition, a child and a puppet
partner received some balls that could be used to play on two
machines, one of which was more interesting than the other one.
Only the participant got some balls when playing on the less
interesting machine; afterward, only the puppet got some balls
when playing on the more interesting one. At the beginning of
the game, the experimenter told participants that the child would
decide first whether to share balls with the puppet when playing
on the less attractive machine, and then the puppet would decide
whether to share with the child when playing on the more
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attractive machine. In fact, the puppet shared in a tit-for-tat way.
Such a process of taking turns to decide whether to share went
on for four rounds. In the control condition, the puppet did not
have a chance to share resources. There was just a less interesting
machine and only the participant received some balls to play.
After the child made a sharing decision with the puppet, they
played a drawing game together. The study focused on whether
participants shared differently in the two conditions. They found
that 5-year-olds, but not 3-year-olds, shared more balls in the
experimental condition in which the child and the puppet took
turns sharing.
This study suggested that 5-year-old children shared
strategically based on whether a partner had the opportunity
to repay the initial prosocial act. However, due to the study
design of repeated interactions, it was not clear whether children
strategically shared at the very beginning or they gradually
learned to share strategically resulting from the partner’s tit-
for-tat reciprocity strategy. In other words, children’s sharing
behavior might be influenced by their partner’s previous
reactions. To exclude the effect of partner’s previous reactions,
in the current study, children and the partner (a female adult)
switched roles only once, with children sharing first and
the partner sharing later. We could thus focus on whether
children share in anticipation of future benefits out of self-
interest consideration without depending on any external cues
or prior interactions. In addition, in Sebastián-Enesco and
Warneken’s (2015) control condition, the child and the puppet
played a drawing game together, in which no balls were used.
One possibility might be that children shared more in the
experimental condition because they knew the puppet needed
balls later, but not in the control condition. To rule out this
possibility, in the current study, stickers were used in both
conditions. Children donated stickers first, and then the partner
donated stickers either with the child participant in the reciprocal
condition or with an anonymous child in the non-reciprocal
condition. We aimed to investigate whether children would
share differently when the partner would either pay them back,
or when the partner would share with someone else.
In addition, if children’s strategic sharing is due to selfish
motivation, it is suggested that they can not only distinguish
whether the recipient has an opportunity to reciprocate, but also
be sensitive to the necessity of obtaining a possible payback.
In Experiment 2, we thus further tested whether 5-year-old
children adjusted their sharing behavior depending on whether
it is worth eliciting reciprocity. We varied the attractiveness (and
thus the value) of the partner’s possession. A vast literature has
demonstrated that preschoolers are concerned about resource
value. For example, they can judge the relative value of different
resources (Harbaugh et al., 2001; Benenson et al., 2015).
Preschoolers also took resource value into consideration when
distributing resources between two recipients (Shaw and Olson,
2013). Additionally, children from age three modified their own
sharing behavior according to the resource value, sharing more
when resources were less desirable (Birch and Billman, 1986;
Blake and Rand, 2010). Therefore, it is possible that children
are also sensitive to their partner’s resource value during the
interaction. When the partner’s resources are of higher value
than children’s own (thus desirable for children), children may
strategically share more in order to elicit the partner’s payback.
Similarly, if the partner’s resources are of lower value than
children’s, they may be less likely to share because they are less
motivated to get payback. To test this possibility, we manipulated
the value of the partner’s resources in Experiment 2. Similar
to Experiment 1, both players played the sharing game, with
the partner playing as a donator after the participant. This
time, however, the partner shared with the participant in both
conditions, thus the partner always had an opportunity to repay
the participant’s favor. The important manipulation was that the
partner’s resources were more attractive than the participant’s
in one condition and less attractive than the participant’s in the
other condition. Thus, by manipulating the partner’ resource
value, we aimed to determine if children were able to further
judge the necessity of performing a strategic sharing behavior.
To sum up, the current study examined two issues about
strategic sharing during a face-to-face interaction. First, we
tested whether 5-year-old preschoolers increased sharing when
a partner had a potential opportunity to reciprocate and when
explicit information about a reciprocity norm was absent. We
hypothesized that children would share more resources when
they would potentially get a payback. Second, we investigated
whether children at this age could adjust their sharing behavior
depending on the value of the partner’s available resources that
might be reciprocated. We predicted that children would behave
generously only when the potential payback was desirable.
EXPERIMENT 1
Participants
Sixty 5-year-old preschoolers from kindergartens in Beijing,
China, participated in this study. Their age ranged from 5 years
1 month to 5 years 11 months (30 females, M = 65.45 months,
SD = 3.42 months). Most of them came from middle-class
families. An additional four children were tested, but excluded
from analysis because of interruption (n = 1), misunderstanding
of the task (n = 1) and an inconsistent evaluation about material
stickers (n = 2, for more details, see Design and Procedure). The
informed consent was obtained from the parents of all children
who participated in the study. The research was approved by
the Institutional Review Board of the Institute of Psychology –
Chinese Academy of Sciences, and was in accordance with its
guidelines.
Materials
The partner got eight different cartoon stickers, portraying a
princess image for female participants and a warrior image
for male participants. By contrast, participants received eight
different number stickers with number symbols on. Two
envelopes in different colors (brown and white) were used to
distribute the stickers.
Design and Procedure
Participants were tested individually in a quiet room in their
kindergarten. The experiment was conducted by a female
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experimenter, who introduced the game rules and was in charge
of the course of the experiment. A female assistant, who was blind
to the purpose of the study, acted as the participants’ partner.
During the test, the participant sat across a table from the partner,
and the experimenter sat by one side of the table at a 90◦ angle
to the child and the partner. The procedure had three phases:
warm-up, sticker-assignment, and sharing. The whole process
was videotaped.
A warm-up phase went first to acclimate children to the
new environment and to the partner, during which the partner
and the child introduced themselves. Then the experimenter
showed them 16 stickers (eight cartoon stickers and eight number
stickers) and asked the participant which kind of stickers s/he
preferred. To ensure that stickers allocated by all participants
were in the same kind and had the same subjective value,
we continued the experiment only in participants who ranked
cartoon stickers as more attractive. In fact, only two children
ranked cartoon stickers as less attractive, and their data were
thus excluded from the data analysis. Then, the experimenter
asked participants to count each kind of sticker, respectively.
There were two purposes for this. One was to ensure that
participants could count to eight correctly. The other one was
to make sure that participants knew the exact number of each
kind of sticker. Participants were corrected immediately once
they miscounted and all participants could count to eight after
being corrected.
The sticker-assignment phase followed the warm-up phase.
The child participant always received less attractive stickers (i.e.,
number stickers) whereas the partner received more attractive
ones (i.e., cartoon stickers). This manipulation aimed to motivate
children to share in anticipation of a payback. To ensure that
the manipulation occurred naturally, the participant and the
partner drew straws to decide which kind of stickers they would
get. The rule was that people who drew a card written Arabic
numeral 1 would get number stickers. Actually, there was “1” on
both cards, and children were asked to draw a card first. As a
result, children always received number stickers. Then, children
and the partner signed their names on their own envelopes (a
brown one and a white one) delivered by the experimenter. The
color of the participant’s envelope was counter-balanced across
participants.
After the partner and the participant received their own
stickers, the sharing phase began. We employed a between-
subjects design. Participants were randomly assigned to either
the reciprocal or the non-reciprocal condition. In the reciprocal
condition, the experimenter told participants that these number
stickers belonged to them, and they could decide whether to share
some with their partner. They could either give out any number
of stickers, or keep all stickers with them if they did not want
to share. They should put the shared stickers into the partner’s
envelope and the rest into their own envelope (Figure 1). After
the game, they would take their envelopes containing the stickers
home. Then, the experimenter also told the partner that the
cartoon stickers belonged to her, and she would decide how
to share after the participant. The procedure was the same in
the non-reciprocal condition except that the recipient was an
anonymous child other than the child participant when the
partner shared. The anonymous child was not present, and was
described as a child from another kindergarten who was the same
age and gender as the participant.
Before the participant shared, a series of comprehension
questions were asked in both conditions to make sure that
participants (1) knew who would get the stickers allocated
by them and by the partner; (2) knew they would share
prior to the partner. If children answered incorrectly, then
the rules would be explained again. All participants answered
the comprehension questions correctly either the first time or
after a repetition of rules. To ensure that children’s sharing
behavior would not be influenced by the experimenter, the
experimenter told them that during the game she would turn
around, and thus could not see how they allocated the stickers.
The participant and the partner were not allowed to talk during
the game, in case a conversation between them would influence
the participant’s initial decision. The partner kept a neutral
expression during the whole process and shared half of her
resources in both conditions when it was her turn to choose
whether to share.
After the game, the experimenter asked who would take the
stickers in the white and brown envelopes, respectively. All
participants answered the post-experiment questions correctly.
In case of possible influence caused by gossip with subsequent
participants, children were required to keep the game a secret
after getting back to the classroom.
Coding
The assistant counted the number of stickers shared by the
participant after s/he left. She then put the stickers back in
the envelope and recorded the number that was shared. The
experimenter double-checked the total 1 day later. Interrater
reliability reported as Cohen’s κ was 1.00.
Results and Discussion
The data were analyzed using SPSS 20.0 (IBM, Inc., Armonk,
NY, USA). The distributions of participants’ sharing in the two
conditions are illustrated in Figure 2. We first tested whether
the proportion of participants who shared differed between
the two conditions. A Fisher’s exact test revealed a significant
condition effect, p < 0.001, with more participants shared in
the reciprocal condition (29 out of 30 participants) than in
the non-reciprocal condition (17 out of 30 participants). Then,
we tested whether there was a difference in the mean number
of stickers shared between the two conditions. The average
number of stickers shared in the two conditions is shown in
Figure 3. A 2 (Condition: reciprocal condition vs. non-reciprocal
condition) × 2 (Gender: boys vs. girls) analysis of variance
(ANOVA) was conducted with the number of stickers shared
as the dependent variable. The result showed a significant main
effect of condition, F(1,56) = 32.71, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.37, with
more resources shared in the reciprocal condition (M = 3.53,
SD = 2.19) than in the non-reciprocal condition (M = 0.93,
SD = 1.11). The main effect of gender was not significant,
F(1,56) = 0.02, p = 0.88, η2p < 0.001, nor was the interaction of
gender× condition, F(1,56)= 0.54, p= 0.47, η2p = 0.01.
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FIGURE 1 | A participant walked to the middle area to allocate stickers between herself and the partner (in red clothes), with the experimenter
(in black clothes) turning her back around.
Our results revealed that more 5-year-old children shared in
the reciprocal condition, and they also shared more stickers in
the reciprocal condition than in the non-reciprocal condition.
In the reciprocal condition, children knew there was a chance
that the partner would reciprocate the favor; in the non-
reciprocal condition, however, children knew that the partner
would not have a chance to reciprocate. Accordingly, children
behaved more generously toward the potential reciprocator.
Therefore, these results suggest that children perform the
prosocial action in the reciprocal condition strategically to elicit
reciprocity for self-interest.
However, there is another possible explanation for the above
results. Children may have shared more in the reciprocal
condition just because the partner would play a game with
them later rather than with others. That is, children’s generosity
had nothing to do with their concern for self-interest, but was
simply a response in some general way to their involvement
in the iterative game (a “sharing game” in the current study).
To rule out this confound, in Experiment 2, the partner later
played a “sharing game” with the child in both conditions.
Moreover, we manipulated the value of the resources possessed
by the partner to further explore whether 5-year-old children
could differentiate the necessity of eliciting the partner’s payback.
If children in Experiment 1 shared more in the reciprocal
condition just because the partner would play a game with them
later, then they would share the same amount regardless of the
different conditions in Experiment 2 because the partner in both
conditions would play a game with them instead of with others.
Conversely, if children indeed performed prosocial behavior to
increase their own possible payback, they would be less generous
when the partner’s possession was less attractive.
FIGURE 2 | Distribution of number of stickers shared in Experiment 1
by condition.
EXPERIMENT 2
Participants
Fifty-nine 5-year-old preschoolers from kindergartens in Beijing
participated in this study. Their age ranged from 5 years
1 month to 5 years 11 months (33 females, M = 66 months,
SD = 3.12 months). Most of them came from middle-class
families. An additional three participants were tested, but
excluded from analysis because of not understanding the task
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FIGURE 3 | The mean number (and standard deviation) of stickers
shared in the two conditions in Experiment 1.
(n = 2) and assistant error (n = 1). Informed consent was
obtained from the parents of all children who participated in the
study.
Materials
Participants got eight different number stickers as in Experiment
1. The partner’s stickers were either eight different cartoon
stickers portraying a princess image for girls and a warrior image
for boys (considered as “high-value” stickers) or eight different
number stickers just as the participants’, but much smaller in size
(considered as “low-value” stickers). Other materials were the
same as in Experiment 1.
Design and Procedure
Participants were randomly assigned to the high-value and the
low-value conditions, which differed according to the kind of
stickers possessed by the partner. In fact, the partner’s stickers
were more attractive (i.e., more interesting content, princess, or
warrior) than the child’s in the high-value condition, but less
attractive (i.e., smaller size) than the child’s in the low-value
condition. The procedure in both conditions was the same as that
in the reciprocal condition in Experiment 1, with participants
playing as the donator first, and they switched roles subsequently.
A video camera recorded the process.
A pretest was run to ensure that the partner’s stickers
were more attractive than the participants’ in the high-value
condition; and less attractive than the participants’ in the low-
value condition. Twenty-eight 5-year-old preschoolers from the
same kindergarten participated in the pretest. Consistent with
our anticipation, most of them, 20 out of 28, thought cartoon
stickers were more attractive than number stickers (binomial test,
p = 0.036), and 26 out of 28 children thought number stickers
that were large were more attractive than those that were small
(binomial test, p < 0.001). This result confirmed that the stickers’
value assumed in different conditions was creditable.
Coding
The procedure of coding was the same as that in Experiment 1.
Interrater reliability reported as Cohen’s κ was 1.00.
Results and Discussion
Figure 4 illustrated the distribution of stickers shared in both
the high-value and the low-value conditions. We first analyzed
whether the percentage of participants who shared differed
between the two conditions. A Fisher’s exact test revealed that
children were more likely to share in the high-value condition (27
out of 29 participants) than in the low-value condition (21 out of
30 participants), p = 0.042. Next, we analyzed whether there was
a difference in the mean number of shared stickers between the
two conditions (Figure 5). A 2 (Condition: high-value condition
vs. low-value condition)× 2 (Gender: boys vs. girls) ANOVA was
conducted with the number of stickers shared as the dependent
variable. Results revealed a significant main effect of condition,
F(1,55) = 11.55, p = 0.001, η2p = 0.17, with participants sharing
more stickers in the high-value condition (M = 2.41, SD = 1.12)
than that in the low-value condition (M= 1.33, SD= 1.18). There
were no significant results of either the main effect of gender,
F(1,55)= 0.032, p= 0.86, η2p = 0.001, or the interaction of gender
and condition, F(1,55)= 1.46, p= 0.23, η2p = 0.026.
To figure out whether the partner’s involvement in the
iterative game had any influence on children’s sharing, we further
compared the proportion of children who shared, as well as
the mean number of stickers they shared between the low-value
condition in Experiment 2 and the non-reciprocal condition in
Experiment 1. A Fisher’s exact test revealed that the percentage
of participants who shared did not differ significantly between
the low-value (21 out of 30 participants) and the non-reciprocal
condition (17 out of 30 participants), p = 0.42. Meanwhile, an
independent t-test revealed that the mean number of shared
stickers between the low-value condition (M = 1.33, SD = 1.18)
and the non-reciprocal condition (M = 0.93, SD= 1.11) was not
significantly different either, t(58)= 1.35, p= 0.13.
Results showed that 5-year-old children shared more stickers
in the high-value condition than in the low-value condition.
This finding suggests that apart from detecting the potential
opportunity for a partner to reciprocate, 5-year-old children
could further recognize the necessity to elicit a partner’s
reciprocity. They shared more when the partner’s resources were
more attractive than theirs, compared to when the partner’s
resources were less attractive. Moreover, we didn’t find that
children shared differently between the non-reciprocal condition
in Experiment 1 and the low-value condition in Experiment 2,
which further excluded the possible explanation that children
shared more simply because the partner would play a game with
them later. Thus, these findings together suggest that children
may behave prosocially out of self-benefiting motivation.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
The current study investigated whether children shared
strategically based on selfish motivation in a direct reciprocity
situation. Experiment 1 demonstrated that 5-year-old children
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FIGURE 4 | Distribution of number of stickers shared in Experiment 2
by condition.
FIGURE 5 | The mean number (and standard deviation) of stickers
shared in the two conditions in Experiment 2.
shared more resources when a partner had a chance to
reciprocate with them, compared to when such a chance did
not exist. It suggests that children perform prosocial behavior
in the reciprocal condition strategically to benefit themselves
eventually. In addition to adjusting prosocial behavior according
to the existence of a reciprocal opportunity, children could
further vary prosociality depending on the value of the resources
that might be reciprocated. As shown in Experiment 2, when
the opportunity of getting a payback existed in both conditions,
children shared more when the partner’s resources were more
desirable than less desirable. Together, both Experiment 1 and
Experiment 2 suggest that 5-year-old children could strategically
share to elicit reciprocity, aiming to increase their own welfare
(although see below for an alternative explanation in terms of
reciprocity in advance of receiving).
These results are consistent with previous findings showing
that children’s prosocial behavior is influenced by an anticipation
of reciprocity; more importantly, it reduces possible influences
from external cues about reciprocity. For example, a very recent
study demonstrated that children preferred a partner who had a
chance to interact with them later and verbally expressed that s/he
would reciprocate (Kenward et al., 2015). However, this study
did not show whether children could choose a reciprocal partner
when such explicit cues about reciprocity (e.g., the partner’s
verbal expression of reciprocity norm) do not exist. Additionally,
research also showed that children were more generous in a
repeated interactive situation, where the partner reacted with
a tit-for-tat strategy (Sebastián-Enesco and Warneken, 2015).
However, in this study it was hard to tell apart whether children
strategically shared at the very beginning or they learned how
to share strategically from the partner’s prior reactions. The
current study eliminated the possible influence from external
cues. The partner did not explicitly stress the reciprocity norm;
additionally, a one round interaction between the participant and
the partner ruled out the possibility that participants learned how
to react based on the partner’s previous feedback. Without these
external cues, we still found that children shared more when
the potential for direct reciprocity was possible. These findings
thus provide strong evidence that children initiatively adjust their
sharing in anticipation of future benefits.
In addition, our results further demonstrate that children not
only share more when a reciprocal opportunity exists, they also
share more when it is more worth it to elicit potential reciprocity.
In Experiment 2, when children donated first and then switched
roles to be a receiver with a partner, 5-year-old children were
more willing to make a costly donation when the interactive
partner possessed valuable resources, thereby exhibiting a strong
self-benefiting motivation. By showing that children take the
value of their partner’s potential payback into account when
sharing, our results thus align with previous findings that children
are concerned about their partner’s knowledge state about their
choices during an interaction (Leimgruber et al., 2012). In this
prior study, 5-year-old children had to decide whether to deliver
one or four stickers to a partner at no cost to themselves. The
donation options were either obscure or visible to the partner.
Children were more likely to deliver four stickers when the
partner was aware of the allocation options than when the partner
was not aware. Besides distinguishing whether a partner was
aware of their choices, the current study further demonstrated
that 5-year-old children were concerned about whether a
partner’s resources were of high or low value. Accordingly,
children appeared to be more generous when the partner’s
payback could increase the value of their prize. Together, the
combined results from the above studies demonstrate that
children are more generous when their anticipated gains could
enrich their overall gain, either in the long run (Leimgruber et al.,
2012) or in the near future (Kenward et al., 2015; also shown in
the current study).
Our study thus demonstrates the existence of strategic
prosocial behavior in 5-year-old children, which extends previous
finding based on Western, educated, industrialized, rich and
democratic (WEIRD) populations to Chinese culture. It seems
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that strategic sharing behavior in children is common in different
cultures, though a large number of studies have shown that
there is substantial variability in children’s social and economic
behavior across countries (Henrich et al., 2010; Blake et al.,
2015a). It would be interesting for future studies to investigate
whether the level of children’s strategic sharing and its underlying
mechanisms vary across cultures.
In addition to demonstrating the existence of strategic sharing
behavior in a non-WEIRD sample, the current study shows
preschoolers’ strategic sharing with a paradigm of Dictator
Game (DG, one decides how much to give and the recipient
is bound to accept the offer, see also Kenward et al., 2015;
Sebastián-Enesco and Warneken, 2015). It thus supplements
previous studies indicating children’s strategic behavior with
other paradigms, such as PD and Ultimatum Game (UG). For
example, Blake et al. (2015b) found that 10- to 11-year-old
children were more cooperative in a game of PD when they
repeatedly interacted with the same partner, compared to when
interacting with a different partner in every round; moreover,
this difference persisted even when researchers only took the
first round of play into consideration. It suggests that children
cooperate strategically and spontaneously when it is possible
for future direct reciprocity. Thus, both the findings in the
current DG and the prior studies utilizing PD demonstrate that
children are strategically prosocial when they can benefit from
the potential positive reciprocity.
Moreover, previous research has also found that children
tactically share more when they may suffer a loss from the
possible negative reciprocity, where unkindness always returns
unkindness (Narotzky and Moreno, 2002). Strategic sharing to
avoid possible loss caused by negative reciprocity is reflected
in the UG (Bereby-Meyer and Fiks, 2013). In the UG, two
participants take the part of the donor and the recipient. The
donor decides how much to share with the recipient. If the
recipient accepts the allocation, the resources would be divided
as proposed by the donor; if the recipient rejects the allocation,
both of them would receive nothing. Dissimilar from the UG, the
recipient in the DG has no opportunity to impose a loss on the
donor, and thus negative reciprocity is impossible. Comparing
the allocation results from both the UG and DG, researchers
found that children were more generous as a proposer in the UG
than in the DG (Bereby-Meyer and Fiks, 2013). Even 4-year-old
preschoolers showed this tendency, with a 7% larger proposal in
the UG (Lucas et al., 2008). The much more sharing in the UG
suggests that children adjust their distribution to avoid possible
loss due to the threat of potential negative reciprocity. Together
with previous studies, our findings show that children weigh their
gains and losses when they share, behaving generously if they
expect to get a desirable payback, or if they want to avoid an
undesirable outcome.
However, apart from strategically eliciting reciprocity, there
may be other explanations for children’s generosity in our study
when the partner had the potential to reciprocate desirable
resources. One may think that children shared more in the
high-value condition just because they were frustrated by their
partner’s desirable resources, and then lost interest in their own
resources. This interpretation is unlikely, because children did
not increase their sharing when the partner also possessed more
attractive stickers in the non-reciprocal condition in Experiment
1. Therefore, the more generous behavior in the high value
condition cannot be attributed to frustration when the partner
had more attractive resources.
Another possibility is that sharing more in the reciprocal
condition and in the high-value condition was due to children’s
direct reciprocity in advance of receiving. That is, an anticipation
of receiving from the partner prompted children to direct
reciprocate themselves in advance of receiving in the reciprocal
condition in Experiment 1. Similarly, children in Experiment
2 might also wish to directly reciprocate (in advance), with
the value of their reciprocal act being adjusted to the value
of the items they expected to receive and therefore resulted
in sharing more in the high-value condition than in the low-
value condition. Sharing for direct reciprocity in advance is
an interesting yet unexplored topic; therefore, future research
is required to investigate whether strategic sharing for self-
interest, direct reciprocity in advance or the combination of both
contribute to children’s generosity when they could benefit from
the partner’s potential reciprocity.
Furthermore, another interesting question about children’s
generosity in our study is to what extent this behavior is truly self-
benefiting on a mechanistic and not just a functional level. Are
children really thinking about how to behave to their advantage,
or is the process more automatic? Although the results showed
that children shared more when the partner had a chance to
reciprocate and when there were benefits to elicit the partner’s
reciprocity, the design in the current study could not provide
convincing evidence about the process of decision-making
underlying children’s sharing. Future study could examine
this issue by manipulating the time that allows children to
make decisions when they share with a possible reciprocator.
Researchers have proposed that thought-out responses require
additional time for deliberation (Rand et al., 2012). Therefore,
setting a time constraint when children share can help detect its
underlying processes. If children share more when their decision
is free of time pressure than when it is under time pressure, a
stronger conclusion may be drawn that children’s generosity is a
thought-out behavior rather than an unconscious response.
It is noteworthy that children also shared some, though less,
in the non-reciprocal condition in Experiment 1, when the
partner had no opportunity to reciprocate. This suggests that
children’s sharing may not be driven purely by a motivation to
maximize their own profit; otherwise they would not have shared
at all in the non-reciprocal condition, when sharing reduces the
number of their own stickers and there is no chance to get them
back. Giving out resources when no obvious gains are foreseen
has also been observed in prior studies, in which preschoolers
often share stickers with anonymous others who have no chance
to reciprocate (Benenson et al., 2007; Harbaugh and Krause,
2007; Gummerum et al., 2010) and its underlying mechanisms
maybe empathy or other-regarding preference (Warneken and
Tomasello, 2009; Edele et al., 2013). However, children’s sharing
in the non-reciprocal condition in the current study can hardly
be explained by these mechanisms, because the partner owns
more desirable resources than children themselves. In terms of
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the underlying mechanism of sharing behavior directed toward
wealthier partners when there is no reciprocity, is it because
of reputation concern (Engelmann et al., 2012; Leimgruber
et al., 2012), a motivation of socialization to establish a good
relationship with others (Brownell, 2013; Brownell et al., 2013),
or a generalized reciprocity consideration (Rankin and Taborsky,
2009; Gray et al., 2014)? Future research is needed to explore these
possibilities. These results thereby illustrate that the motivation
behind prosociality is various, and may be a combination of both
altruistic and selfish motivations.
In sum, the current study shows that preschoolers initiatively
conduct a prosocial behavior oriented at future payback. Besides
“looking back” when making decisions about how much to share
(Robbins and Rochat, 2011; House et al., 2013; Warneken and
Tomasello, 2013), our finding expands this line of research by
showing that 5-year-old children also “look ahead”, linking their
current sharing behavior with their partner’s possible subsequent
decisions. They behave generously with an expectation that
their kindness would be returned by kindness through a
partner’s subsequent moves. In particular, children did not
know for sure about the partner’s actual sharing when they
made their own decisions, yet they shared when there was an
opportunity for reciprocity, and when the potential reciprocal
resources were desirable. The current study thus suggests
that 5-year-old children’s prosocial behavior can go beyond a
reaction to their partner’s prior kindness (Robbins and Rochat,
2011; House et al., 2013; Warneken and Tomasello, 2013),
and can be further motivated by an anticipation of future
benefits returned from the partner. It would be interesting
for future studies to investigate the origins of these “look
ahead” prosocial behaviors, and the underlying mechanisms,
such as delay of gratification, prospection, theory of mind,
etc. (Moore and Macgillivray, 2004; Coricelli and Nagel, 2009;
Brandimonte et al., 2010; Takagishi et al., 2010; Garon et al.,
2011).
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